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“How  Civic is the Center?”




They speckle the urban panorama of many mid- to larger sized cities such as
Hartford. Their nondescript, typically box-like exterior is a testament to the affinity
among architects for steel-reinforced concrete as a building material during 1960s and
70s. More specifically, their great numbers illustrate the desperation of community
leaders across the nation that drove them to willingly embrace the bulldozer approach to
urban revitalization that typified the 1960s. When it opened to the public with great
fanfare in January of 1975, the Hartford Civic Center, then billed as the largest
entertainment and conference facility in New England, was widely heralded as a
progressive solution to the problems of decline in the central business district. When all
was said and done, 70 million dollars were expended, 25,600 cubic yards of concrete
poured, 250,000 cubic yards of earth moved, and 2,200 tons of reinforced steel erected,
all in an effort to reverse the tragic and accelerating decay of the urban core.’
Hartford’s own leviathan is located on a 7.5acre tract bordered by Trumbull,
Ann, Asylum, and Church Streets. The area was designated as blighted in the early
196Os,  which qualified it for federal money made available as a provision of federal
Housing Act of 1949. According to David Schuyler, the somewhat loosely defined
specifications of what constituted blight gave municipal authorities considerable control
over local redevelopment initiatives2  Subsequent revisions to the act in 1954 and 1959
allowed local governments to expend ten and later twenty percent of urban
redevelopment funds on non-residential projects.3 Thus, the federal government provided
municipalities across the nation with a power vehicle to excise dilapidated sections
’ Memo from  Dick Bergstrom, City of Hartford. Facts Sheet Re. The Hartford  Civic Center, January  1975
(?). Hartford Studies Project, Trinity College.
2 David Schuyler, A City Transformed:  Redevelopment,  Race,  and Suburbanizat ion in Lancaster ,
Pennsylvania, 2940-1980  (University Park, Pa.: Penn State Press, 2002): 4-5
located on the fringes of the central business district, many of which housed the urban
poor, and replace them with tax-generating commercial projects.
The genesis of the Hartford Civic Center represents the Zeitgeist of the post-war
era of urban redevelopment. It reflects the concerns with race relations, housing, class
urban flight, and a shrinking urban economic base that typified this period. Using the
Hartford experience as a model, this paper examines how the design and use of the Civic
Center complex, its promotion by civic boosters, and later public reception both
1 reinforced and reflected a persistent dialectical tension between black and white, rich and
I poor, urban dwellers and suburbanites, regionalists and home rulers, commerce and social
c!b.M~
services. As a subset, the sixteen year period that elapsed between the project’s initial
proposal in 1959 and its dedication in January 1975 provides a window through which to
examine how the massive demographic shifts and social changes then taking place in
Hartford framed or modified arguments for or against its construction.
Although the idea of constructing an arena to honor the veterans of World War II
was initially proposed in 1945, the proposal gained momentum when it was presented as
part of the 1959 Hartford city plan prepared by the Baltimore architectural firm, Rogers,
Taliaferro, Kostritsky and Iamb. The local newspapers heralded the plan, which included
a revamping of the downtown shopping district and the addition of a shopping center, as
a means to compete with shopping centers that were beginning to dot the suburban
landscape! It was argued that Trumbull St., the proposed site of the coliseum, would
provide a powerful stimulus to redevelopment of the dilapidated West Side of downtown,
in addition to serving as a counterpoise to redevelopment projects, such as Constitution
3 Ibid., 67-68.
4 Stanley Zabroski,  “Planner Will Unveil Downtown Renewal,” iYurtford  Cowant,  l/24/59,  1,
Plaza on the East Side. As early as 1959, the polarization of Hartford from its suburbs
became abundantly clear as community leaders speculated whether the suburbs would be
content simply to watch their ailing parent wither5  The Baltimore firm concluded no less
than a 10 million dollar downtown revitalization plan could prevent decline of the city’s
grand list, which reflected the value of taxable property. This descent would contribute
to an already rising mill rate, thus shifting the burden of taxation onto city residents and
exacerbating a mass exodus of the middle class (Table 1).6
Table 1. Rate of Taxation/Indebtedness, Hartford
1 9 5 0 1 9 5 9
Mill Rate 37.5 46.7
Net Bonded Debt $7,176,367. $24,989,400.
Indebtedness $9,42  1,000. $25,278,000.
Figures taken from  the Connecticut State Register and Manual
By the late 195Os,  Hartford, like other northeastern cities, exhibited the obvious
signs of deterioration. Reduction in the number of manufacturing jobs available to
Hartford’s unskilled or semiskilled residents combined with the concomitant
demographic shift  and decline in the city’s population stemming from interstate highway
construction and federal policies that promoted suburban expansion, led to the onset of a
full-blown financial crisis by the mid-1960s. This change in the city’s fortunes
manifested itself in a precipitous drop in retail sales, which declined as a percentage of
total retail sales in the metropolitan area from 37 percent in 1959 to 27 percent in 1968.’
Given this transformation, Hartford could ill afford to take its preeminence as a regional
center of business and industry for granted.
’ “‘Hartford’s Next 21 Years,” Hartjbrd  Courant,  l/29/1959;  Ralph Minard, “Sites Vie for Coliseum: Front
St. vs. Trumbull,” Hartford  Times, 6/I  7/59.
6 Ralph Minard, “Renewal or Tax Dip Choice Facing City,” Hartford Times, 1 l/14/59,1.
’ Position Paper from  the Urban Development Committee to The Board of Directors, Greater Hartford
Chamber of Commerce, June 10, 1970. Arthur J. Lumsden papers, University of Hartford Libraries,
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The thousands of African Americans who migrated from the south to work in the
defense industry during the 1940s and 50s were perhaps hardest hit by this decline given
their vastly diminished range of choices in housing and jobs. In 1959, though still
relatively small in number when compared to the white population (16,500 compared
with 170,599),  a reporter for the Hartford Cow-ant  observed the growth of the African-
American population and their movement outside the boundaries of the ,portion  of the
North End populated by almost exclusively by African Americans in 1950. Although the
writer appeared sympathetic to overcrowded and unsafe conditions in the North End,
which he cited as an impetus toward their migration, there is a perceptible tenor of fear
evinced in the statistics that presented an African-American birthrate almost 2 ‘/z times
that of white residents and the distant, almost anthropological tone with which he
described this seemingly foreign populace.’
By 196 1, the city settled upon the Trumbull St. area as a redevelopment site and
potential home for a coliseum. To that end, a bond issue to cover the city’s portion of a
10.6 million-dollar redevelopment plan was passed by voters in a referendum in
November of that year. The funds were used to acquire and clear the 7-X acre tract upon
which were situated small businesses, rooming houses, a movie theatre, and a YWCA. As
a consequence of the bulldozer approach to urban renewal favored during the 196Os,  the
land, cleared by mid-decade, lay fallow.
Until 1965, very little progress on the Civic Center project occurred until Arthur
Lumsden, then executive vice-president of the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce
entered the picture. A somewhat controversial man, his politics remained unclear to other
’ Thomas F. Walsh, Tegro  Population Grows - Expands from Northeast Area,” Hartford  Courant,
l/19/59,4.
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community leaders. Depending on whom one spoke to, he was viewed as either an ardent
New Dealer or economic conservative.’ What remains clear, however, is that Lumsden as
head of the Chamber, though obviously pro-business, was abundantly aware of the
massive changes in the city’s demographics and economic fortunes since moving to
Hartford nearly a decade earlier in 1956. Reversing the effects of a decade’s worth of
decline required no less than a project of the Civic Center’s scale and he would not take
no for an answer.
When Lumsden approached Aetna Life Insurance Company in March of 1965
with the suggestion of financial support for the project, the state of Hartford was rather
grim. While the region continued to grow and prosper, the city population decreased by
15,000 people, a trend that continued into the 60s and beyond. Although the 1964
opening of Constitution Plaza bolstered the city’s tax rolls, it could not entirely
compensate for the precipitous drop in manufacturing employment combined with
Hartford’s growing reliance on state and federal aid. In a memo to A. Henry Moses, Vice
President of Aetna, Lumsden suggested ways in which the company could assist
financially in the “rebuilding” of Hartford. In the concise, direct fashion for which he was
well-known, Lumsden laid out a host of projects worthy of the insurance giant’s
consideration that included the construction of office buildings, a parking facility,
housing, and lastly a Civic Center to be located on the Trumbull redevelopment site. Not
surprisingly, the first three suggestions were dismissed by Lumsden as either
unnecessary, in the case of the office buildings, or problematic as was cited with the
9 William Keifer,  “Lumsden Rated Bossy, Creative,” Hartford  Times, 212  l/68,  1,
parking and low-middle income housing propositions.1o  Regarding the proposal for
constructing low and middle income housing Lumsden warned:
It is my personal judgement that a single institution like Aetna,
building housing to meet the housing needs of the city, may get your
company involved with a multitude of problems that would work to
the detriment of your community image. The rents charged to
sustain such a project would always be questioned by tenants, for
example. And, you would also have problems in connection with
segregated versus non-segregated housing, as this, in turn, gets you
involved in de-facto segregation of schools, new school buildings,
the kind of people who make up the population of the city, and a
multitude of other problems. l1
This line of reasoning would prove both ironic and prophetic only two years later in the
wake of civil disturbances that took place in Hartford and other cities across the nation.
Indeed, this  failure to acknowledge the dire need for low-income housing came back to
haunt the Chamber in the opposition expressed over the Civic Center bond issue in 1968.
Aetna evidently approved of this idea and in November of that year provided the
Chamber with a $40,000.00  grant to conduct a feasibility study. The Chamber engaged
the architectural firm Rogers, Taliaferro, Kostritsky and Lamb, who conducted the 1959
city plan. The resulting proposal called for an 8,000 seat arena, an increase over the 3,000
seat facility recommended in the 1959 plan, a 50,000 square foot exhibit hall, a 1,300
space parking garage, 110,000 square feet of retail space, a twin cinema, and 480,000
square feet of office space.12 Despite the proposed collaboration between the city and a
private developer, presumably Aetna, the plan estimated a $29 1 ,OOO.OO deficit annually
for a 9-year period, which would be reduced to $28,000 for the  remaining five. These
deficits would be absorbed by the city of Hartford or private sources. A provision for





housing in the Trumbull redevelopment site, though considered in the proposal, was
determined better met by the Bushnell Plaza, a 300 unit project for middle to upper
income tenants, and at Riverview, a project proposed for 1,300 units of low to middle
w income housing. l3
When evaluating the justifications for the Trumbull Center provided by the
consultants and ratified by the Chamber it becomes clear that before the 1967 riots in
I
Hartford their emphases were squarely on the economic benefits accrued to the city.
Among these, attracting a lucrative convention business was among the most prominent,
and a Convention and Visitors Bureau was established in June of 1964 to this end.
Lumsden, undoubtedly courting the executives at Aetna, mentions this fact in a letter to
Edward H. Warner along with the perhaps overly optimistic observation that a
convention hall would bring twenty times the existing convention business to Hartford. l4
The imminent threat of plans for arena and convention facilities in neighboring
Springfield, Massachusetts and New Haven likely contributed to this sense of urgency
and certainly prompted the enlargement of the coliseum from the earlier plan. The 1966
study also broadly hinted that another major hotel, which would later become the ITT
Sheraton, would be needed in order to accommodate major conventions.‘5
Project boosters insisted a lucrative convention business would also improve
flagging retail activity, a concern particularly in light of competition from  suburban
shopping centers. When not in use for arena events, the parking facilities could be used
by daytime shoppers. Supporters of the Trumbull Center contended the inclusion of a
” Trumbull Center Feasibility Study: Final Report, April 13,1966.  Arthur J. Lumsden papers, 5.
l3 Ibid., 6.
” Arthur J. Lumsden to Edward  H. Warner, Dec. 15,1965.  Arthur J. Lumsden papers.
I5  Trumbull Center Feasibility Study, 39-40.
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shopping area within the complex would promote an easily traversed, compact, retail
center to satisfy the demands of those accustomed to the layout of regional shopping
centers. It was supposed that the addition of plazas, enclosed pedestrian walkways and
malls would make shopping downtown a more attractive option in addition to “making
double use of the valuable retail core land.“16 Notably absent from these justifications,
however, are any references to job creation for city residents or appeals to the facility as a
community center that would become more pronounced following the civil unrest of
1967.
The substance of these justifications began to shift, however, in the wake of the
riots that gripped Hartford for three consecutive summers beginning in 1967. The
economic conditions of the urban poor had not changed appreciably since 1959, in fact
they had gotten worse. Although per capita income in Connecticut increased by 33.8
percent from 1960 to 1967, it only increased 27.6 percent among Hartford’s residents,
while neighboring West Hartford’s figure grew by 53.1 percent. Accordingly, the average
income of a Hartford family in 1967 was $9,157.00  compared with $15,795.00  for their
West Hartford counterparts. One astute newspaper reporter observed this emerging
dichotomy of “poor cities and rich towns,” where boundaries were no longer demarcated
by railroad tracks, but by the geopolitical boundaries between the cities  and towns
themselves. l7
What fueled these tensions centered on the increasing concentration of poor
people, the majority African American, into overcrowded and dilapidated housing in the
I6  Memorandum from  Arthur J. Lumsden to the Urban Development Committee and the Business Area
Development Committee of the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 27,1965.  Arthur J.
Lumsden papers, 8.
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North End. The notable lack of job opportunities for the urban poor, reflected in both a
growing unemployment rate and a 2 1.5 percent increase in state welfare aid from 1960 to
1967, contributed to the hostility.‘* Throughout the second half of the 1960s Hartford’s
African American community activists decried the failure of the city power elite to make
housing and education a priority in the renewal agenda. In the  wake of the 1967 riots,
Wilbur G. Smith, president of the Hartford branch of the NAACP, read before the
delegates present at the organization’s annual convention a letter sent to Lumsden on his
organization’s behalf. The letter implored Lumsden as “a leading spokesman for a
power&l  arm of the white communil$’  not to take steps merely to control the present
civil unrest, but instead seek ways to implement long-term solutions “made to your
organization for many, many years by the local chapter [of the] NAACP and ~thers.“‘~
The letter also criticized the lack of job opportunities for young minority residents in the
city’s 3,000 businesses as well as the Chamber’s Housing Development Corporation’s
proposal to build low-income housing in an already overcrowded area.
This lack of commitment to better the lot of the urban poor in Hartford was
observed by those outside the city as well. Offering ostensible praise for the
revitalization of downtown Hartford through the construction of Constitution Plaza, an
article published in The Providence Sunday Journal cited the city’s almost exclusive
focus on commercial projects at the expense of public housing, which the writer observed
““Gap Between City, Suburb Wealth Widening in State, Profile Shows,” New Haven Register, 12/8/68,
59.
‘*  “City Slips in Job Category,” Hartford Times, g/12/68;  “State Grants to City Up 40% in 7 Years,”
Haflord  Cow-ant,  313168.
l9 “Dignity Goal ih Hartford Riots,” Boston Herald Traveler, 7/M/67;  Wilber G. Smith to Arthur B. [sic]
Lumsden, July 14,1967.  Arthur J,  Lumsden papers.
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as running counter to the thrust of the Providence renewal agenda.*’ Despite these
criticisms, however, Lumsden defended the Chamber’s record of accomplishment on
improving the circumstances of the minority poor. When interviewed almost a decade
later, Lumsden considered advocating the hiring of minorities, the launching of Project
Concern, a voluntary program to bus urban school children to neighboring suburban
schools, building 3,000 units of housing for low-income residents, and most of all, the ill-
fated Greater Hartford Process, a controversial three-part scheme that included a plan to
develop land in North Coventry, a town 15 miles north east of Hartford among the
Chamber’s accomplishments.*’ However, even Lumsden conceded that despite receiving
mild praise from the Kerner Commission for their efforts, the city was worse off than it
had been before carrying out many of their top-down initiatives, including the building of
Constitution Plaza, Bushnell Towers, an expressway system, and the establishment of a
regional planning agency.**
This gulf of opinion between members of the white business establishment such
as Lumsden and those of African American community activists such as Wilber Smith
would play out in the Civic Center bond issue debate that followed a year later. Sadly,
this is one instance of many in which neither side was right or wrong. Rather, the conflict
represents the intersection of opposing points of view. In reality, the city’s business and
political leaders did work on behalf of its poorer residents to a much greater degree than
before symptoms of the urban crisis manifested themselves, however, these efforts were
perceived by the opposing side as too little, too late, and not carried out with direct input
2o “A Masterpiece of Downtown Renewal,” The Providence Sunday Journal, 12/5/65.  Arthur J. Lumsden
gapers.
Interview with Arthur J. Lumsden, May 15,1975. Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, University of
Connecticut.
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from the communities affected. African American community leaders believed they were
at the mercy of the Chamber, and until the city’s minority and/or poor residents mobilized
politically, the situation was not likely to change.23
In the wake of this turmoil during the summer of 1967, Aetna extended a
generous offer to finance a portion of the Trumbull Center project and serve as developer.
Additionally, the company offered to contribute an unspecified percentage of the profits
from the private portion of the complex to offset the city’s burden.” The additional 15
million dollars for the proposed coliseum and exhibition hall would be financed by the
city through the introduction of a bond ordinance. In a fashion undoubtedly shaped by
existing social tensions, the text of the ordinance emphasized the communal uses of the
facility over remunerative ones.25 The public would be provided with an opportunity to
express their views in a hearing scheduled prior to the Council’s final vote on whether to
include it as a bond issue the following November. The hearing and ensuing Council vote
would both reflect and intensify existing divisions within the community.
Perhaps the most enthusiastic exponent of the Civic Center, aside from  the
Chamber, was the press. Between June and Election Day 1969, the press launched an
aggressive educational program designed to inform readers of the manifold benefits
derived from a Civic Center as well as the penalties accrued if the bond issue failed to
pass. While the public appeals continued to place emphasis on increasing tax revenues,
attracting conventions and trade shows, providing a venue for major sporting events, and
stimulating retail trade and other commercial development, there is a perceptible
** Ibid.
*’ Common Ground (Hartford, 1969; produced by Julian Biggs). Courtesy of the Hartford  Studies Project,
Trinity College.
24 “Aetna Offers to Develop Trumbull Civic Center,” Hartford  Cow-ant,  8/2/67,  1.
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augmentation of the entreaties that, the like wording of the bond ordinance, focused on
how the Center would improve the social climate rather than the business one.
Specifically, job creation for the city’s poor crept into the pro-Center rhetoric along with
the rationale that increased tax revenues would be channeled toward social services. The
justification that the Civic Center would provide a much-needed sense of unity, both
within the city itself and with its suburbs was also presented.26
Despite ardent support by the Chamber and the Hartford press, plus a carefully
chosen cavalcade of speakers, including a token African American, assembled by the
Chamber to emphasize the project’s merits, the heated debate that took place at the public
hearing on July 8,1968  revealed considerable opposition to the Center. Community
activists including Wilber Smith of the NAACP chapter, Maria Sanchez and Muriel
Johnson of the Council of 12 (C-12), and Sandra Klebanoff of the League of Women
Voters disavowed the Center’s merits and opined that housing and educational needs
should come first.27  Still others rejected the plan on the grounds that Hartford residents
should not bear the financial risk and suggested the project be funded regionally or
through private investment. Notwithstanding the evening’s controversy, the Council
authorized the city manager to spend up to $60,000.00  to hire a consultant to draft a more
detailed plan at the conclusion of the hearing. Though still lacking a final Council vote, it
25 Journal of the Court of Common Council of the City of Hartjord,  December $1967  - December 30,
1968,809.
26 The articles that appear in the Hartford newspapers emphasizing these points are too numerous to
mention. Nevertheless, there are a few particularly noteworthy for their ardent boosterism. Driscoll,
Theodore, “Where the Trumbull Center Will Rise: Center Benefits Outweigh Cost,” Hartford Courant,
6/16/68,  1; “Hartford Needs Trumbull Street Project,” Hartford Cow-ant, 6/5/68;  William Keifer,  “Civic
Center: Toward a New City,” Hartford Times, 612 l/68, 1. This article presented the pros and cons via a
fictitious round table discussion that included a Times reporter, a member of the City Council, a Chamber
representative, a taxpayer, a welfare worker, and an administrator, all of whom proclaimed unanimous
approval of the project by the article’s conclusion.
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certainly looked as though the Civic Center Bond issue would appear on the Election Day
ballot.
Although the evening’s controversy proved to be the utter antithesis of the appeals
to community unity expressed by the Civic Center’s boosters, Lumsden and the Chamber
continued their advancement of the project despite strong opposition expressed by
community activists. This is clearly illustrated in Lumsden’s response to a letter sent by
Rev. Richard Cockrell, pastor of the Church of the Good Shepherd in Hartford, who
suggested the opposition and various stakeholders meet to “talk frankly  about the kinds
of overtones spoken at the hearing . . . concerning the proposed Civic Center.” In his
reply, Lumsden suggested scheduling a meeting after the September 6ti  Council vote and
recommended that discussions should focus on the positive benefits accrued to city
residents from an enlarged tax base in the way of housing and education. However, with
the passage of the bond ordinance, Lumsden did not feel the need to pursue any further.28
What certainly framed and polarized the debate was the failure of the City
Council to authorize a 15.8 million dollar bond issue for the construction of a University
Park, a proposal that recommended the construction of a new Weaver High School
adjacent to the University of Hartford and would also include the Annie Fisher School.
Making things worse, the Council also rejected a two million dollar bond issue to build
scattered site housing. Although the Chamber openly stated its support of the rejected
proposals, it is safe to say the majority of the Chamber’s time, energy, and resources were
committed to ensuring the passage of the Center’s bond issue. The dismay over the City
” Proposed Schedule of Speakers and Topic for Trumbull Civic Center Hearing, Monday, July 8,1968.
Arthur J. Lumsden papers; “Hearing Asks: How ‘Civic’ is Center Plan?,” Hartford Times, 7/9/68,3B,  7A,
Driscoll, Theodore, “Businessmen Back Civic Center Plan,” Hartford Cow-ant, 7/9/68,  1,6.
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Council’s presumable favoring of a Civic Center over proposals that dissenters believed
would directly address the needs of the urban poor was best expressed by Muriel
Johnson, a neighborhood activist who framed the debate in the following terms:
On July 8,1968,  I flew from  Washington to attend a hearing and [it] was
all about a Civic Center that was gonna give 400 minority people menial
jobs cleaning toilet, sweeping floors, barmaids, to put up this 15 million
dollar Civic Center where poor folks can’t buy a ticket to attend a theatre
there. Where we can’t eat or sleep. . . . But they didn’t pass a bill for a new
educational park because they weren’t concerned about our children
learning. Aetna Life Insurance [would] rather put up a 15 million dollar
bond [for the Civic Center] than put up a 15 million dollar bond for our
kids to have a decent school or for the poor people of Hartford to have
new housing, now doesn’t that say something for this great city of
Hartford?29
The Council’s failure to approve the University Park for the November ballot posed a
public relations challenge for the Chamber as well. To ensure passage of the Civic Center
bond issue meant raising an additional $20,000.00  to further promote the project’s merits
to the electorate.30  All evidence points to the success of this campaign: the issue passed
the referendum by a margin of nearly three to one. One newspaper account of the election
optimistically observed that voters in District 3 1, a predominantly African American
district, approved the bond issue by a margin of almost nine to one (437/50)  although in
reality an additional 487 votes would have not the slightest hope of influencing the
outcome.31  It was, in fact, merely a reflection of the general feeling of powerlessness
among the minority population in Hartford during this period when responding to the
28 Richard Cockrell to J.M.K Davis, July 15, 1968; Arthur J. Lumsden to Richard Cockrell, Aug. 9, 1968;
Margaret W. Lawson to Arthur Lumsden, Nov. 25,1968.  Arthur J. Lumsden papers.
29  Common Ground (Hartford, 1969; produced by Julian Biggs). Courtesy of the Hartford Studies Project,
Trinity College.
3o Arthur J. Lumsden to E. Clayton Gengras, Oct. 4,1968.  Arthur J. Lumsden papers.
31 William Keifer, “Civic Center Gets Big Vote,” Hartford Times, 1 l/6/68,  Bl.
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dictates of the establishment.32  For better or worse, the Civic Center would become a
reality.
Following passage of the bond issue, steps were taken to hire an architect for the
project. This process involved numerous site visits to other Civic Centers across the
country that culminated in June of 1969 with the appointment of Vincent J. Kling  and
Associates, a Philadelphia firm as principal architect and Harry J. Danos and Associates
of Hartford as associate architects. Almost a year later, in May of 1970, the architects
submitted a revised plan that proposed enlarging the facility by 13 1,000 square feet and
included a larger 10,000 seat arena that would cost the city twice as much as the original
proposal. The overrun necessitated yet another bond ordinance, which owing once again
to the Chamber’s push and attendant support of the press, passed in November of 1970 by
a margin of two-to-one. A second bond issue for the construction of an additional parking
garage on Church St. passed by a narrow margin. It was thought the vastly increased
dimensions of the facility would ensure Hartford’s primacy over rival facilities in
Springfield, New Haven, and Providence.33 The addition of a 20-story,  400-room  hotel
co-developed by ITT and Aetna in March of 197 1 sent the total amount allocated to the
project from public and private money soaring toward the 80 million dollar mark.
Like the rhetorical evolution of the project’s objectives detailed in the previous
sections, the progression of architectural designs reflects the shift in social conditions
over the course of the project and their impact on notions of modernity in urban space
planning. The design dating from 1959 featured four discrete structures, a coliseum,
exhibit hall, shopping center and hotel that converged on a large plaza and were
32 Common Ground (Hartford, 1969; produced by Julian Biggs). Courtesy of the Hartford Studies Project,
Trinity College.
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interconnected by outdoor malls. When considered alongside subsequent renditions, it is
ironic that this earlier design appears to engender the sense of community utterly lacking
in the final architectural plan ostensibly promoted by supporters of the project. By the
1966 feasibility study, however, the complex began to take its present form, a single
multi-level structure consisting of elevated pedestrian malls, the various units of which
were interconnected by interior “streets”. Unfortunately, the initial design submitted by
Kling  and Associates on the eve of the ground breaking, which.bore  a striking
resemblance to the 1959 plan and featured a dramatic, round coliseum, was abandoned
due to cost and climate considerations.34
The overall design of the Hartford Civic Center and numerous others like it was
undoubtedly influenced by the work of Victor Gruen, widely credited as the father of the
regional shopping center. Gruen later took an intense interest in the revitalization of the
central business district through the incorporation of elements proven successful in
suburban shopping centers, namely the introduction of covered walkways, fountains,
benches and skylights to provide the ambiance of a city street without the perceived
dangers. Of course, ample and convenient parking figured prominently in the formula.35
Various writers have observed that the rather imposing, fortress-like exterior of these
urban entertainment complexes was by no means accidental. Rather, they fostered a
secure and pleasant environment to attract apprehensive suburbanites back to the
downtown. Indeed, the principal architect, Lewis Eisenstadt, extolling the merits of the
Center’s “urban design” observed that it was entirely possible for a person to park his car,
33  Theodore Driscoll, “Center Geared to Pump Excitement into Area,” Hartford  Courunt,  513017  1,9.
34  H. Evan  Snyder, et al., “The Hartford Civic Center: A New Urban Energizer,” Connecticut Architect 11,
no. 2 (1975): 12.
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check into a hotel, have a meal, go shopping, see a movie, and attend an event at the
coliseum without ever having to go outdoors.36  By the late 197Os,  the failure of
Constitution Plaza and its architect’s “pure planning” approach to revitalize downtown
was negatively contrasted with the virtues of a newer, multi-use facility like the Civic
center.37
Unfortunately, this “city within a city”, as the Civic Center was described, neither
succeeded in luring suburbanites back to mother Hartford nor engendering the sense of
community envisioned by the planners and civic leaders. As early as 1980, William H.
Wythe astutely observed the deleterious effects of diffusing  pedestrian activity through
the introduction of underground concourses and second-level enclosed walkways on
community life, particularly in small to mid-sized cities such as Hartford.38  Sadly, the
figurative “city within a city” became, in effect, literal: the creation of a city for visitors
and another for its poorer inhabitants.39
An examination of the shops and restaurant that occupied the Civic Center Mall
when it opened in 1975 also reinforces the idea of the Center as a recreational facility for
i
middle-class suburbanites to the exclusion of the majority of city-dwellers. The press
described the mall’s shops as upscale, and the restaurants as gourmet. An article
published in the New York Times that offered premature praise of the Civic Center’s role
in Hartford’s comeback identifies the exclusion of fast-food restaurants and discount
35 David Schuyler, “A City Transformed: Redevelopment, Race and Suburbanization in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, 1940-1980 (University Park, Pa: Penn State Press, 2002): 108-109.
36 “The Architect: An interview with Lewis Eisenstadt, AIA,”  HartjbrdiUagazine,  Jan. 1975,8.
37 Patricia L&man, “Constitution Plaza and the Cityscape: After 15 Years, How Has Hartford Changed?,”
Sunday: The Hartford Courant,  6/27/79,6.
38 William H. Whyte, “The Humble Street: Can It Survive?,” Historic Preservation 32, no. 1 (1980): 38.
39 The concept of the “tourist bubble” is explored in greater depth in Harvey Newman’s article, “Race and
the Tourist Bubble in Downtown Atlanta,” Urban AJizirs Review 37, no. 3 (2002).
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stores as pivotal to the Center’s success in attracting upscale tenants and patrons40  It is a
sad irony that 28 years later approximately two-thirds of the mall’s storefronts are
unoccupied. The reviled chain stores and fast food outlets of decades past have replaced
the ones that remain.
The failure of the Civic Center Mall to attract an established clientele might be at
least partially accounted for by the accelerated racial and class segmentation of the retail
market brought about by the regional shopping center. Historian Lizabeth Cohen argues
that when regional shopping center developers set out to “create a more perfect
downtown” they excluded from it those groups who failed to conform to a rather
monolithic suburban population. Thus, the causes of market segmentation may be viewed
as derived both from the geographic isolation of regional shopping centers from the urban
core and attempts by developers to reconstitute the downtown center in exclusionary
terms.41  Carrying Cohen’s argument full circle raises a host of questions, the
consideration of which would wind up an entire paper in itself. Assuming suburban
shopping malls were designed as exclusionary re-creations of downtown centers, which
in turn led to a segmentation of the market based on race and class, how does this theory
affect the success of mall-style retailing when the suburban shopping center is transported
back to the downtown center as Gruen advocated? Lessons learned from  the Civic Center
Mall would indicate that Cohen’s contention had a fair amount to do with its failure.
After the initial euphoria that marked the Center’s opening diminished, the upscale
4o Lawrence Fellows, “A Big Shopping Mall and Lots of People Mark Downtown Hartford’s Resurgence,”
New York Times, l/5/75, D4,55.
4’ Lizabeth Cohen, “From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community
Marketplaces in Postwar America,” American Historical Review 101 (Oct. 1996): 1059.
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clientele headed for the familiar suburban terrain of Westfarms  Mall and the facility
languished.
Ultimately, the planning, execution, and design of the Civic Center subverted the
project’s aims as a locus of community interaction. Contrary to the goal of uniting a
fragmented regional populace expressed by civic leaders following the civil unrest of the
late 196Os,  the Civic Center actually exposed and intensified existing tensions divided
along racial and class lines. Although the Trumbull Redevelopment project succeeded in
its objective to expand the tax base and encouraged new commercial development, this
merely perpetuated the increasingly circumscribed role of downtown as a zone of office
space, vital only Monday through Friday between the hours of nine and five.
The choice of a commercial project on the Trumbull Redevelopment site was in
many respects a foregone conclusion. Although the poorer residents of Hartford were in
dire need of new housing, educational and recreational facilities, it is perhaps overly
pollyannaish to think a parcel of land in the central business district, an area that
encompasses one to two percent of a city’s area yet accounts for twelve to twenty percent
of its tax revenue, would be allocated to less remunerative uses.42  Still, hindsight affords
us the opportunity to speculate whether a provision for housing or more community
involvement in the planning might have influenced the long-term  outcome.
In the lobby of the Civic Center exhibition hall, a plaque commemorates the
installation of an elegant granite floor, which appears rather incongruous when compared
to the utilitarian concrete steps it precedes.
42 Jon C. Teaford,  “The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in American, 1940- 1985
(Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990): 19.
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The plaque reads:
The floor pattern in this area expresses the purpose of this Civic Center as
a gathering place for the individuals of the community. At the center, a
large circle and diamond symbolize the Civic Center as a nucleus, around
which people join hands in celebration of togetherness.
What is most shocking is that these sentiments were expressed not at the building’s
dedication, but in 1998!  However, they certainly underscore the basic, timeless human
need for a forum to encourage community interaction and public discourse. This
hyperbole permeates the justifications for nearly every facility that ostensibly serves the
public good. Its rationale carries through to this day with the Adriaen’s Landing project,
whose convention facilities will, ironically, likely preempt the remaining convention and
trade show business eagerly sought by the Civic Center’s boosters over thirty years ago.
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